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In an especially liberal moment, John Stuart Mill declares that “the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against liberty” and that “The a priori assumption is in favour of freedom,”​[1]​ a declaration one contemporary liberal dubs the “Fundamental Liberal Principle.”​[2]​  Since same-sex marriage [henceforth: SSM] prohibitions limit the liberty of citizens, the a priori assumption is that they violate liberalism’s commitment to liberty.  But some have argued that it is the recognition of SSM—not its prohibition—that conflicts with liberalism’s commitments.  For example, Jeff Jordan declares that:
Liberalism does not require legal recognition of same-sex marriage.  In fact, it cannot, since legal recognition is incompatible with… principles of liberalism… The push for legal recognition of same-sex marriage, though often packaged as being motivated or required by liberal reasons, is in fact illiberal.​[3]​
Susan Shell argues that the “liberal sword cuts both ways,” insisting that:
American citizens should not have the sectarian beliefs of gay-marriage advocates imposed on them unwillingly… The requirement that homosexual attachments be publicly recognized as no different from, and equally necessary to society as, heterosexual attachments is a fundamentally illiberal demand.​[4]​
I refer to the thesis that recognition of SSM is illiberal as “The Charge.”  If something like The Charge is correct, then recent attempts to prohibit SSM by public referendum, congressional action, and constitutional revision are perfectly legitimate on liberal grounds while recent state court decisions compelling its recognition are indefensible.​[5]​
	Some proponents of SSM are bound to dismiss The Charge as implausible on its face and worry that taking it seriously amounts to lending credence to an untenable position.​[6]​  However, something like The Charge has public currency​[7]​ and least one familiar argument against recognizing SSM—that SSM should not be “forced down the throats” of its opponents—greatly resembles Shell’s protest against imposing on the beliefs of unwilling citizens.  As a sympathetic liberal, I take The Charge seriously enough to consider and ultimately reject it.  Ultimately, I contend that The Charge is simply misguided and that arguments for it either fail to find support in some liberal principle or else find support from some illiberal principle.  

II.	Direct Arguments for The Charge
The “Basic Principle” of Liberalism
In response to the question “What does it mean for the government to treat its citizens as equals?” Ronald Dworkin famously answers that “government must be neutral on what might be called the questions of the good life.”​[8]​ Arguably, this commitment to neutrality is captured in the “Basic Principle” of liberalism:
The Basic Principle of Liberalism (BP): a state “should not promote or justify its actions by appeal to controversial conceptions of the good [life]”​[9]​  
Some arguments against SSM prohibitions appeal directly to (BP), claiming that there is no way to justify denying access to the rights and benefits and protections associated with civil marriage to same-sex couples without appealing to controversial conceptions of the good (such as the moral superiority of heterosexuality or the procreative family).​[10]​  However, liberal philosophers should not take it for granted that SSM prohibitions must violate liberal neutrality.  Indeed, some arguments for the Charge appeal directly to liberalism’s commitment to neutrality; I shall refer to arguments that appeal directly to this commitment as “direct arguments.”  One direct argument appeals to (BP) itself.

The Basic Argument
As noted above, Jordan asserts The Charge.  To that end, Jordan distinguishes three different “models” of marriage.  The first model is the “Sacramental” model.  This model implies, inter alia, that God instituted marriage as a lifelong relationship between one man and one woman.​[11]​  Such a model implies that SSM, as well as various polygamous relationships, are not really marriages since marriage requires a monogamous opposite sex couple.  However, the Sacramental model is “ontologically thick”—that is, it involves substantial metaphysical assumptions about the existence of God and natural law—and, apparently, (BP) “requires that the state forswear ontologically thick models and restrict itself to models that are ontologically thin.”​[12]​ So, by Jordan’s own lights, the Sacramental model is a liberal non-starter.
	Two other models of marriage are available, however: the Communional and the Transactional model. The Communional model implies, inter alia, that:
There is a natural or biological teleology apparent between the male and the female—“a two-in-one-flesh Communion of persons that is consummated and actualized by acts that are reproductive in type, whether or not they are reproductive in effect…”​[13]​
The Communional model is supposed to be ontologically “thin”—that is, free from substantial metaphysical assumptions about God and natural law, for example.  The Transactional model is similarly ontologically thin, implying only that marriage is a transaction regulated by the state that is beneficial to the persons involved.​[14]​  
With these models distinguished, Jordan’s “Basic Argument” comes quickly:
For the state to recognize same-sex marriage, then, requires an appeal to a controversial view of marriage as a justification for that state action.  By recognizing same-sex marriage the state would, in effect, declare that the Transactional model is correct, and that the Communional model is incorrect.  In this way the state would be violating its desirable neutrality regarding controversial views of the nature of marriage.​[15]​
Presumably, the idea is that models of marriage are tied up with conceptions of the good life such that if the state declares that one model of marriage is (in)correct it ipso facto answers questions about the good life, thereby violating (BP).  If so, the Basic Argument can be reconstructed thusly:
1)	If the state fails to remain neutral among conceptions of the good life, then it is illiberal
2)	If the state declares that one eligible model of marriage is correct or that another eligible model is incorrect, then the state fails to remain neutral among conceptions of the good life
3)	If the state recognizes SSM then it declares that the Transactional model is correct and that the Communional model is incorrect
4)	Therefore, if the state recognizes SSM, it is illiberal
1) is supposed to reflect (BP) and be plausible to any liberal.  2) is supposed to capture Jordan’s assertion that a state violates its “desirable neutrality” by declaring that some model of marriage is (in)correct.  3) reflects the fact that while the Transactional model allows that SSM is possible, the Communional model does not since the two-in-one-flesh union essential to marriage cannot be realized by same-sex couples, such that recognition of SSM implies that the Communional model of marriage is incorrect by implication.​[16]​  
There is much to be said against the Basic Argument, but note initially that it is subject to a fatal dilemma.  Here is the first horn.  By parity of reasoning, the liberal state must forswear any ontologically thick model of marriage if it forswears the Sacramental model.  Crucial to the Communional model is the two-in-one-flesh union, talk of which is pervasive among the natural lawyers and theistically inclined philosophers, some of whom suppose, that “reproductive-type acts unite a male and female as a single organism, viz., make them ‘two-in-one-flesh.’”​[17]​ Many philosophers outside of those traditions struggle to understand how two different people could literally become a new organism​[18]​ or ridicule the very idea.​[19]​  If the two-in-one-flesh union has a home only in a natural law or theistic setting, the Communional model is not an eligible one since it requires substantial metaphysical assumptions.
Still, whatever others mean when they refer to a two-in-one-flesh union, Jordan suggests that the Communional model can survive in a naturalistic setting.​[20]​ Perhaps it is a mistake to suppose that reproductive-type sex acts result in the creation of an altogether new organism akin to an animal or a person; perhaps they result in a new organism only in the way that dancing with someone does—a dancing duo.  But now insisting that this naturalistically palatable two-in-one-flesh union is essential to civil marriage appears to be an ad hoc stipulation; at least, it is unclear why it or the potential for it is necessary for civil marriage.  So, either the Communional model is ontologically thick or it is implausible and, in either case, not an eligible model of marriage.  Thus, even if 1)-3) of the Basic Argument are true, it does not follow that by recognizing SSM a state fails to be neutral among eligible models of marriage.

Two Kinds of Liberal Neutrality
Note that (BP) is decomposable into two distinct theses about liberal neutrality that are best kept separate.  Here is one thesis:
Justificatory Neutrality (JN): a liberal state is precluded from justifying some policy on the grounds that one conception of the good life is superior to another.
So understood, the liberal commitment to neutrality constrains the sort of reasons that a liberal state can permissibly offer in defense of some policy.  Presumably, (JN) precludes justifying permitting only Christian symbols in public parks on the grounds that Christianity is the superior faith and from forbidding racist hate speech on the grounds that the racist’s moral values are impoverished.  (JN) is bound to be popular among liberals who suppose that matters of public policy must in principle be justifiable to all citizens in terms that they would or could reasonably accept, precisely because a justification that could be accepted by all does not imply that other conceptions of the good are inferior.​[21]​  Still, another conception of liberal neutrality should be considered:
Effectual Neutrality (EN): a liberal state is precluded from promoting one conception of the good life more than another or at least to cancel or compensate for any uniquely favorable effects thereby granted to that conception.​[22]​
Generally, it is individual persons who endorse a conception of the good life that can have their interests promoted (or advanced or frustrated or set back).  If a state prohibits the possession of hunting rifles but not other long-barreled firearms, it would be strained to insist that some conception of the good life has been frustrated and not that sportsmen whose conception of the good life involves possessing hunting rifles have had their interests frustrated.  Surely if prohibiting only hunting rifles conflicts with (EN), it is because a state treats some citizens unfairly.  Thus, I understand (EN) as shorthand for the more complicated thesis that a liberal state should not promote the interests of some citizens more than others without canceling or compensating for any uniquely favorable effects, and that talk of “promoting conceptions of the good life” is convenient shorthand for the more complicated thesis suggested here.
	I take it, then, that an argument that recognition of SSM is illiberal because its recognition violates liberalism’s commitment to neutrality assumes either (JN) or (EN).  But it is difficult to see how any argument for The Charge that appeals to either (JN) or (EN) will be successful.  Or so I argue.

SSM, Illiberality, and (JN)
Consider (JN) first.  If recognizing SSM violates (JN), it must be that any state that recognizes SSM is justifying that policy on the grounds that some conception of the good life tied up with SSM is superior to another.  So understood, a liberal state that declares that SSM is legally permissible is performing some illiberal illocutionary act—in recognizing SSM, it violates (JN).​[23]​  This argumentative strategy is taken up, for example, by philosopher-judge Richard Posner who worries that “permitting homosexual marriage would be widely interpreted as placing a stamp of approval on homosexuality”​[24]​ and by Francis Beckwith who complains that states who recognize SSM are “instructing its citizens on what they ought to believe is good, true, and the beautiful.”​[25]​  Neither argument is likely to be successful.  
Beckwith’s argument fails because of an ambiguity with respect to his claim that recognizing SSM involves “instructing.” In its most conventional sense, instructing someone about A involves explaining how to go about A-ing.  But it is difficult to see what is illiberal about this: a state that explains how to file for unemployment or request a passport hardly does anything illiberal.  But perhaps Beckwith objection is that recognizing SSM involves instructing, not how, but that something is the case—that in recognizing SSM, the state is instructing that SSM is “good, true, and beautiful.”  But it is not plausible to suppose that, in recognizing SSM, the state is instructing in this second sense since is not generally the case that in recognizing some liberty, the state communicates that something is good, true, or beautiful.  Suppose that a state declares, for the first time, that citizens do have the right to engage in hate speech.  In recognizing a right to hate speech, the state need not instruct its citizenry that hate speech is good, true, or beautiful; a judge that declares that hate speech laws are unconstitutional may simultaneously decry hate speech and express her hope that no one ever engages in it.  
My response to the second way of understanding Beckwith’s complaint suffices as a response to Posner as well and to any argument that recognizing SSM is illiberal based on (JN).  Even if it is the case that recognizing some right would otherwise amount to performing some illocutionary act, a state can cancel any implication that it approves or favors or endorses SSM at the same time thus ensuring that in recognizing SSM it is not issuing a “stamp of approval” or any such thing.  If it is generally the case that speakers can take steps to ensure that they do not perform some illocutionary act, then there is no necessary connection between recognizing SSM and violating (JN).
Another point.  It is fairly common to hear that proponents of SSM are attempting to “redefine” the meaning of marriage in violation of significant cultural and historical traditions.  More likely, however, proponents of SSM are not redefining anything; rather, proponents and opponents of SSM simply endorse different analyses of the concept of marriage.  If I understand, Jordan’s “models” of marriage are analyses of the concept of marriage.  It is not generally true that providing an analysis of the concept of C amounts to justifying C; settling on an analysis of the concept of a poison does not require supposing that anyone should consume it.  If it is not generally the case that appealing to some conception of the good life is necessary to provide an analysis of C, it is unclear why proponents of SSM must be doing anything illiberal in violation of (JN).  Jordan stipulates that marriage is good for society on the Communional model and good for those married on the Transactional model.​[26]​  But there is no inconsistency in supposing that a thing is good in some respect while denying it is part of the good life: a misanthropic Satan-worshipper might agree that marriage is a god-given institution that benefits society while insisting that marriage should be avoided for those very reasons. As such, it is simply unclear why recognition of SSM must violate (JN).

SSM, Illiberality, and (EN)
Consider, then, arguments for The Charge that rely on (EN).  If recognizing SSM violates (EN), it must be that any state that recognizes SSM is illicitly promoting that policy.  But like arguments that invoke (JN), arguments that invoke (EN) are also bound to fail.  Recognition of SSM, admittedly, makes some people better off than they are now but that does not settle whether recognizing SSM violates (EN).  
Recall that (EN) does not preclude promoting a conception of the good life, only promoting a conception of the good life absent canceling or compensating for uniquely favorable effects.  A state that recognizes SSM could cancel for uniquely favorable effects by imposing undesirable obligations and responsibilities on married same-sex partners or deny them certain desirable benefits.  For example, a state could both recognize SSM and impose a unique duty of care on married same-sex partners and increase the costs of marriage for same-sex couples, perhaps requiring them to come to one another’s rescue no matter what or to defray the costs of their partner’s medical care; it could mandate special counseling or therapy or a waiting period for such couples prior to issuing a marriage license; it could demand community service in some form for the continued recognition of their marriage; it could tax them at a higher rate than opposite-sex married couples, and so forth.  Alternatively, a state could both recognize SSM and deny married same-sex couples certain benefits of civil marriage.  For example, a state could deny married same-sex partners some of the tax benefits associated with civil marriage or it could refuse to extend them privileges associated with child-care.  Either strategy would cancel for the favorable effects of SSM.  Yet another strategy involves compensating those who do not benefit from the recognition of SSM, perhaps by precluding them from certain responsibilities or by providing them with certain benefits.  I doubt that many, if any, of these measures would be acceptable to proponents of SSM, but that is besides the point for present purposes.  The point is simply that there is no necessary connection between recognizing SSM and illicitly favoring some conception of the good life, such that arguments for The Charge based on (EN) are bound to fail.
Another response to arguments for The Charge based on (EN) turns a familiar objection on its head.  It is common enough to object to SSM on the grounds that it involves conferring “special rights” on homosexual persons: since everyone, including homosexual persons, already has the right to marry—albeit not the right to marry just anyone—proponents of SSM must be calling for some new presently unrecognized right.  However, recognition of SSM would emphatically not confer the right to marry someone of the same sex only on homosexual persons, but on all persons.  As such, recognition of SSM would not uniquely privilege any particular conception of the good life.  But recall that (EN) only demands canceling or compensating for uniquely favorable effects.  Presently, there are presently some 1,138 rights and benefits, including significant tax benefits, not available those with no interest in opposite-sex marriage that are already available to opposite-sex couples.​[27]​ As such, recognizing SSM does not uniquely privilege anyone, but, at best, establishes parity.
Of course, some opponents of SSM will object that they have no interest in marrying someone of the same sex such that its recognition would not promote their interests. However, if those with no interest in SSM do not benefit from its recognition, parity of reasoning suggests that those with no interest in opposite-sex marriage do not benefit from its recognition.  If (EN) precludes recognition of SSM on these grounds, it similarly precludes recognition of opposite-sex marriage as well.
	I conclude that no direct appeal to liberalism’s commitment to neutrality secures The Charge.  But other arguments for The Charge are also available that do not appeal directly to any principle concerning liberal neutrality but to some other principle independently plausible to liberals.  I consider a host of such “indirect” arguments below.

III.	Indirect Arguments for The Charge
Any indirect argument for The Charge must appeal to some ostensibly liberal thesis.  An indirect argument will fail if either that relevant principle is not really one that liberals would endorse or if the relevant principle really is a liberal one but does not support prohibition of SSM.  I submit that all the indirect arguments that I consider below fail for one of these two reasons.

The Argument from Public Subsidies	
	In his defense of SSM, Ralph Wedgwood suggests that recognizing SSM might be justified if doing so benefits married same-sex couples and imposes no significant burdens on others.​[28]​  Of course, all public subsidies burden someone; any subsidy requires increasing the tax burden of citizens or redistributing a tax base thereby using funds that could be dedicated elsewhere.  Some public subsidies are legitimate on liberal grounds and some not.  Controversial cases include subsidizing students who attend private religious schools and artists who produce work that many find offensive or worthless.  The following principle is supposed to clarify when public subsidies are legitimate on liberal grounds:
The Legitimacy Principle for Public Subsidies (LPPS): A public subsidy of a practice or institution is legitimate if and only if subsidizing that practice or institution is necessary for producing a vital good for society, which good cannot be produced or secured in a less burdensome way.​[29]​
Opponents of SSM who object that recognition of SSM would unreasonably elevate health care costs or tax social security funds or some such thing are implicitly endorsing something like (LPPS).  And if, by recognizing SSM, the state unfairly burdens some citizens, then recognizing SSM runs afoul of (LPPS).  This reasoning is captured in the following “Argument from Public Subsidies”:
1)	Subsidizing SSM is legitimate if and only if subsidizing SSM is i) necessary for producing a vital good for society or ii) the good of SSM cannot be produced or secured in a less burdensome way
2)	Recognizing SSM is illiberal if publicly subsidizing it is illegitimate
3)	SSM does not produce a vital good for society
4)	Therefore, recognizing SSM is illiberal
1) is a straightforward application of (LPPS) to the issue of SSM and 2) is a reasonable liberal reaction to social policy that runs afoul of (LPPS).  3) is undoubtedly controversial but no small number of opponents of SSM defend it. 
Some arguments for 3) are doomed to fail.  Michael Levin once objected that granting homosexual persons presently unrecognized rights would imply that society has “rethought the matter” and concluded “homosexuality is not as bad as it had previously supposed” and that this turnabout could raise the odds that children will grow up to be homosexual and thereby harmed.​[30]​   However, after acknowledging that dispositional explanations appear to be the best accounts of the origins of sexual orientation, not environmental ones, Levin came to reject this line of argument.​[31]​ 
Still, the supposition that children of same-sex parent households must be harmed or at least made substantially worse off if SSM is recognized is a fairly common one. Indeed, the most common strategy utilized in defense of 3) is to argue that heterosexual marriage supplies vital social goods that SSM does not or cannot supply.​[32]​  Given its relevance to debates about SSM, I want to give special consideration to the thesis that same-sex parent households cannot supply social goods related to procreation and child-rearing.  This aside is relevant for another reason, given that liberal states certainly accept that it is a good reason in support of some legislation that it would prevent or seriously diminish the likelihood of harm to others.  If SSM prohibitions do prevent harm to children, they are at least plausible on liberal grounds.

An Aside on Same-Sex Parenting
There appear to be two different rationales supporting 3) of the Argument from Public Subsidies: the stepfamily rationale and the life without father rationale.  
Consider the stepfamily rationale first.  Arguably, stepfamilies provide a comparatively poor environment for raising children, so poor that the prudent course of action is to “do everything possible to minimize their occurrence.”​[33]​ There is reason to believe, for example, that children living in stepfamilies are significantly more likely to suffer from emotional, behavioral, and academic problems; that they generally suffer from poorer health; that they are at significantly greater risk for physical and sexual abuse, and so forth.​[34]​ Arguably, then, “stepchildren are not merely ‘disadvantaged,’ but imperiled.”​[35]​ But every child in a same-sex parent household lives with, at most, one biological parent such that every same-sex parent household is a stepfamily.  By implication, then, same-sex parent households imperil children and recognizing SSM would certainly deny society some vital good.
Similarly, the life-without-father rationale implies that SSM cannot benefit children, such that a state that places children in same-sex parent households makes children worse off, thereby harming them.  More precisely, the life-without-father rationale asserts that only opposite-sex parent households can provide an environment conducive to adequate child development and welfare.  Some research suggests that fathers are especially apt to contribute to healthy child development in particular ways: they promote security, curiosity, and problem-solving capacities in infants; they increase school readiness and the likelihood of appropriate school behavior; they contribute to stronger cognitive and verbal development; they curb violence; they develop empathy and compassion, and so forth.​[36]​ Perhaps mothers too are especially apt to contribute to child development in particular ways.  If so, then subsidizing SSM denies children access to what that they need for healthy development—a mother and a father—thereby, again, depriving society of a vital good.
For any number of reasons, both rationales are seriously flawed.  Consider the stepfamily rationale first.  The primary difficulty facing the stepfamily rationale is a logical one.  Clearly, not every stepfamily arrangement is inferior to any arrangement in which children remain with their biological parents; at best, stepfamily arrangements tend to be inferior, children in stepfamilies typically worse off, and so forth.  The question, then, is whether what is typically true of stepfamily arrangements applies in the anomalous case of same-sex parenting.  If not, the stepfamily rationale is an instance of the fallacy of the accident.  
There is reason to suppose that SSM arrangements are anomalous cases—that the deficiencies and risks associated with stepfamily arrangements are not associated with same-sex parent households in particular.  For example, research suggests that child molesters and perpetrators of incest are disproportionately heterosexual men.​[37]​ Other research suggests that same-sex parents possess tendencies and capacities crucial to the emotional and psychological well-being of children to greater degrees than their heterosexual counterparts: lesbian couples are seemingly more aware of the skills necessary for parenting than their heterosexual counterparts and that they display a superior ability to identify critical issues in child-care situations and formulate appropriate solutions.​[38]​   Still more research suggests that gay fathers more consistently emphasize limits on children’s behavior, go to greater lengths in promoting cognitive development by explaining rules and regulations, are more sensitive and responsive to the perceived needs of their children, go to extra lengths to act as a resource for their children, and so forth.​[39]​  So, even if children in stepfamily arrangements are typically harmed and deprived, children in same-sex parent household need not be. 
Consider, instead, the life-without-father rationale.  Absent some argument that tendencies and capacities necessary for child development are possessed uniquely by male parents, for example, the life-without-father rationale fails.  But even if men do tend to possess certain tendencies and capacities necessary for child development to greater degrees than women, it is surely still possible that female parents can possess or acquire those tendencies and develop them to some sufficient degree.  Further, same-sex parents could possess other tendencies and capacities to such degrees that more than compensate for deficiencies.  Absent an argument that same-sex parents must lack tendencies and capacities relevant to child development—an argument that does not appear to be forthcoming—the life-without-father rationale similarly fails.
Perhaps the argument is not that at least one parent in a same-sex household will lack some tendency or capacity crucial for child development, but rather that same-sex partners will jointly fail to provide something crucial, say, gender-differentiated parenting​[40]​ or the development of healthy sexual identity.​[41]​ But here too, research suggests otherwise.  One recent survey suggests that children of lesbian mothers do not typically suffer gender-identity difficulties, that their behavior tends to fall within typical limits for conventional sex roles, that their peer relations develop normally, and so forth.​[42]​ Another concludes that “the children of lesbian and heterosexual parents are remarkably similar, specifically in the areas of intellectual functioning and behavior adjustment” and that “neither father presence nor parental heterosexuality is crucial for healthy child development.”​[43]​ 
In the interests of full disclosure, some proponents of SSM see too much support for SSM in the social sciences.  Even if middle to upper-class lesbian parents whose children are the products of artificial insemination tend not to suffer gender-identity difficulties, it hardly follows that this will be true of children in same-sex parent households generally.  Further, it is probably a mistake to speak of the “unanimity” of research relevant to same-sex parenting—that “there seems to be no appreciable difference between children brought up in stable homosexual homes and those brought up in stable heterosexual ones.”​[44]​  But differences are not necessarily deficiencies as two reviewers critical of earlier research concerning same-sex parenting conclude:
Because every relevant study to date shows that parental sexual orientation per se has no measurable effect on the quality of parent-child relationships or on children’s mental health or social adjustment, there is no evidentiary basis for considering parental sexual orientation in decisions about children’s “best interests.”​[45]​ 
Some will worry that the present argument against the stepfamily and life-without-father rationales relies too much on the contingent facts about the present state of social science.  Suppose that same-sex parent households cannot provide the social goods that opposite-sex parent households provide; 3) still would not follow since it implies that subsidizing SSM provides no vital social goods, not that it fails to provide those supplied by subsidizing opposite-sex marriage.  Both rationales are simply non-sequiters.

The Argument from Public Subsidies Redux
	Recall that (LPPS) is disjunctive: it also implies that subsidies are illegitimate if they do not produce vital goods for society that can be produced or secured in a less burdensome way. So, consider another version of the Argument from Public Subsidies:
1)	Recognizing SSM is illiberal if doing so requires publicly subsidizing it but i) SSM is not necessary for producing a vital good for society or ii) the good produced by SSM can be produced or secured in a less burdensome way
2)	Recognizing SSM is illiberal if publicly subsidizing it is illegitimate
3)	Goods produced by SSM can be produced or secured in a less burdensome way
4)	Therefore, recognizing SSM is illiberal
Again, whether 3) is true is an empirical question.  Again, there is evidence that 3) is false—that recognizing SSM would provide significant financial benefits and do so cheaply.  For example, a recent report of the Congressional Budget Office found that allowing same-sex couples to marry in all fifty states would save the federal government nearly one billion dollars a year, while other studies suggest that Connecticut could increase state revenues between 3.1 million and 13 million per year in the first three years of permitting SSM while Vermont could reap between 18.1 and 22.8 million.​[46]​  The disposable income of same-sex households would be increased if they had access to the tax benefits and spousal privileges presently denied them and various states would be spared the legal costs associated with defending and considering challenges to SSM prohibitions.  Thus, subsidizing SSM would not violate (LPPS).​[47]​
	Here too, though, suppose we bracket contingent social facts; there is still reason to doubt the soundness of the Argument from Public Subsidies.  Any state that recognizes SSM will likely see a substantial number of same-sex couples marry initially, though that number likely will decline in later years.​[48]​ Suppose that state initially sees a substantial financial boon, but that the monies collected from licensing SSM are insufficient to support a subsidy later.  In that case, the liberty associated with SSM is contingent on the presence of a sufficient number of persons interested in exercising it.  Alternatively, suppose that some states have wealthy patrons who contribute generously to subsidize SSM if it is recognized while other states have no such patrons.  In that case, the liberty associated with SSM is contingent upon the presence of sympathetic wealthy patrons.  Surely liberals will deny that the guarantee of various liberties depends upon such contingencies and that suggests that (LPPS) is an illiberal principle.

The No-Exit Argument
A citizen of Baltimore City filed a motion to intervene in a Maryland case about SSM asserting that because “the homosexual lifestyle [was] against [her] religion, permitting SSM would burden her right to freedom of religion.”  The motion was denied.​[49]​  While it is difficult to see how recognizing SSM per se violates anyone else’s rights, some opponents of SSM worry is that if SSM is recognized, some persons with profound moral or religious objections will be unjustly coerced into compliance.  Levin worries that there is a tension between extending civil rights and protecting the right of free association.​[50]​  Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the Boy Scouts of America to admit an openly homosexual assistant scoutmaster violates their First Amendment right of expressive association.​[51]​ Whatever our reasons for wanting to avoid association, a liberal commitment to the right of association seemingly speaks against coercing citizens into associating with one another and denying them the opportunity to “exit” that association. 
To capture this general concern, consider the following:
The No-Exit Principle (NEP): No just government can coerce a citizen into violating a deeply held moral belief or religious belief​[52]​
The “No-Exit Argument” incorporates (NEP) in the following syllogism:
1)	If a state coerces a citizen into violating a deeply held moral or religious belief then that state is illiberal
2)	If a state recognizes SSM, it coerces citizens into violating their deeply held moral and religious beliefs
3)	Therefore, if a state recognizes SSM, it is illiberal
In support of 2), opponents of SSM object that recognition of SSM would, for example, force employers to provide health care benefits to same-sex spouses and force landlords to rent to same-sex couples over their moral and religious objections.​[53]​  
	Focus initially on 2).  It is far from clear that recognizing SSM really coerces parties into association with those they wish to avoid.  Presumably, a state could both scrap all anti-discrimination legislation while also recognizing SSM, after all.  Suppose that recognition of SSM is not possible without legislation prohibiting private acts of discrimination.  It would still not follow that recognizing SSM would require employers to provide benefits to same-sex spouses or require landlords to rent to same-sex couples.  Rather, recognizing SSM would have the effect that anti-discrimination legislation has generally: it would require employers to provide benefits to same-sex spouses if they choose to provide benefits to heterosexual spouses; it would require landlords to rent to same-sex couples if they choose to rent at all, and so forth.  Perhaps present employers and landlords would have a complaint since they did not know that they would have to associate with same-sex couples.  But a liberal state could adopt measures that would allow parties to “opt out”: perhaps they could be given the opportunity to sell their relevant assets to the state for fair market value thereby exiting the relationship.  If this response can be generalized, then recognition of SSM need not violate (NEP).​[54]​
	There is an even better reason to suppose that the No-Exit Argument is unsound: (NEP) and 1) along with it are implausible and no liberal should endorse them.  The problem is not that seemingly liberal states sometimes coerce citizens into violating deeply held moral or religious beliefs.  United States citizens who refuse to pay taxes in support of a war that they find to be unjust and immoral can be coerced into compliance despite their moral or religious objections. But perhaps the United States is illiberal given the availability of alternative tax structures friendly to conscientious objectors.  Rather, the problem is that (NEP) has outrageous consequences: racist paramedics and firefighters could legitimately refuse to revive or rescue persons outside of their race; landlords who find divorce sinful could refuse to rent to divorcés; xenophobic teachers could refuse to educate the children of immigrants, and so forth.  All could claim legitimacy if (NEP) is correct.  It will not do to insist that racist civil servants violate other people’s rights and can therefore be justly coerced: that only shows there are circumstances in which a liberal state can justly coerce citizens into violating their deeply held moral and religious beliefs—that is, that (NEP) is false.  
	
IV.	Conclusion 
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